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      Attorney for Appellees 
 
 
 __________________ 
 
 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 __________________ 
 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
 The Philadelphia Housing Authority transferred one of 
its police officers from special drug enforcement duty to regular 
patrol duty after his appearance at a bail hearing as a character 
witness for a reputed organized crime associate.  The officer 
contends his transfer violated his free speech and association 
rights.  At trial, after the close of all evidence, the district 
court granted defendants judgment as a matter of law under Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 50.  We will affirm.1 
 I.  Background 
 The plaintiff, Donald Green, has been employed as a 
police officer for the Philadelphia Housing Authority Police 
Department since November, 1991.  In February, 1994, he was 
assigned to the Housing Authority Police Department's Drug 
Elimination Task Force ("DETF").  The DETF is a special unit that 
works together with other law enforcement agencies to combat 
illegal drug activity on Philadelphia Housing Authority property. 
                     
1.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our standard of 
review is plenary.  See Watters v. City of Philadelphia, 55 F.3d 
886, 891 (3d Cir. 1995). 
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 Several weeks after his assignment to the DETF, Green 
received a telephone call from Norman Keller, a friend of over 
twenty years, asking him to testify as a character witness on 
behalf of his son, Herbert Keller, at a bail hearing in federal 
court.  Pursuant to Housing Authority Police Department 
regulations, Green made a written request to his immediate 
supervisor for permission to testify.  Green received approval, 
provided that he testify during his lunch hour and in civilian 
clothing. 
 On March 23, 1994, Green appeared at the bail hearing, 
and Keller's attorney introduced him by name and occupation.  The 
magistrate judge then proceeded to read the charges pending 
against Keller, which included organized crime activity in 
connection with the Stanfa crime organization.  Green, who until 
that time was unaware of the organized crime charges, told Keller 
he could not be associated with the case and left the hearing 
without testifying.   
 Later that day, an unidentified law enforcement officer 
told the DETF Captain, defendant Daniel Rosenstein, that Green 
had appeared as a character witness for a member of the Stanfa 
crime organization.  Rosenstein ordered Green removed from 
"street" work and told him there would be an investigation into 
his possible ties with organized crime.  Rosenstein then sent a 
memorandum to the Housing Authority Police Department's Deputy 
Chief of Police, defendant John Cresci, recommending such an 
investigation and requesting Green's temporary transfer to 
regular patrol duty pending its outcome.  
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 Subsequently, Cresci discussed the matter with the 
Housing Authority Police Department's Acting Chief of Police, 
defendant William Bergman.  They decided a departmental 
investigation was unnecessary because it would duplicate the 
ongoing federal investigation of the Stanfa crime organization, 
and also because they did not believe Green was affiliated with 
organized crime.  But Cresci and Bergman agreed with Rosenstein 
that Green should be transferred.  On March 31, 1994, Green was 
formally transferred from the DETF to regular patrol duty.       
 Green's duties changed as a result of his transfer.  As 
a DETF officer, Green participated in drug raids, made drug-
related arrests, and was generally responsible for enforcing the 
drug laws.  After the transfer to regular patrol duty, Green was 
principally assigned to work out of a building's security booth. 
 Green's salary was not reduced, although he claims his 
opportunities to work overtime (and consequently to earn overtime 
pay) decreased. 
 Green contends his transfer constituted unlawful 
retaliation for protected First Amendment activity.  He brought 
this action against the Philadelphia Housing Authority, 
Rosenstein, Cresci and Bergman under: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for 
violation of his First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and 
association; 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) for violation of his right to be 
free from retaliation for his appearance as a witness in federal 
court; and the Pennsylvania Constitution for deprivation of 
reputation without due process of law.   
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 At trial, defendants Bergman and Cresci testified they 
had no information or even suspicion Green was involved with 
organized crime,2 but that his transfer was nonetheless 
justified.  They explained Green was transferred "in case there 
was anything where [the Housing Authority Police Department] 
might be embarrassed . . ." and because it "was right for the 
organization."  (J.A. at 122, 164.)  In their brief on appeal, 
defendants maintain they transferred Green out of their concern 
that the appearance of his ties to organized crime would "bring[] 
. . . discredit upon the image of the [Housing Authority Police 
Department], [and] endanger[] the plaintiff."  (Appellee's Br. at 
10.)3 
 At the close of evidence at trial, the district court 
granted defendants' Rule 50 motion for judgment as a matter of 
law on all claims.  Green brought this appeal.  In reviewing the 
district court's judgment, we must determine whether "viewing all 
the evidence which has been tendered and should have been 
admitted in the light most favorable to the party opposing the 
motion, no jury could decide in that party's favor." Watters v. 
City of Philadelphia, 55 F.3d 886, 891 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting 
                     
2.  Bergman also testified that, if he had any such suspicion, he 
would have fired Green instead of merely transferring him. 
3.  As far as we know, Green has not been reinstated to DETF 
duty.  At trial, Cresci and Bergman testified that Green may be 
reinstated after the close of the Stanfa trial.  Rosenstein 
testified somewhat differently, stating that Green's 
reinstatement turned on whether the Housing Authority Police 
Department found him innocent of wrongdoing.  Green testified 
that Cresci told him his transfer was permanent. 
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Walter v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 985 F.2d 1232, 1238 (3d Cir. 
1993)).   
 II.  Discussion 
 A.  Section 1983 (First Amendment) 
 On appeal Green contends his First Amendment right to 
free speech was violated because he was transferred in 
retaliation for his appearance as a character witness at Keller's 
bail hearing.  A public employee's claim of retaliation for 
engaging in a protected activity is analyzed under a three-step 
process.  See Pro v. Donatucci, 81 F.3d 1283, 1288 (3d Cir. 
1996); Watters v. City of Philadelphia, 55 F.3d 886, 892 (3d Cir. 
1995); Swineford v. Snyder County Pa., 15 F.3d 1258, 1270 (3d 
Cir. 1994).  A plaintiff must first demonstrate the activity in 
question was protected.  Second, the plaintiff must show the 
protected activity was a substantial or motivating factor in the 
alleged retaliatory action. See Swineford, l5 F.3d at l270.  
Finally, defendants may defeat plaintiff's claim by demonstrating 
"that the same action would have been taken even in the absence 
of the protected conduct."  Id.  The district court did not reach 
the last two factors because it resolved the first factor in 
defendants' favor as a matter of law.  Accordingly, our 
discussion will focus on the first step, whether Green's 
appearance in court was a protected activity. 
 To qualify as a protected activity, Green's court 
appearance must satisfy the Pickering balancing test.  See 
Pickering v. Board of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, Will 
County, 391 U.S. 563 (1968).  First, the court appearance must 
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constitute "speech . . . on a matter of public concern."  
Watters, 55 F.3d at 892.  Second, the public interest favoring 
his expression "must not be outweighed by any injury the speech 
could cause to the interest of the state as an employer in 
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs 
through its employees."  Id.  See also Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568 
("The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the 
interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon 
matters of public concern and the interests of the State, as an 
employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it 
performs through its employees."); Versarge v. Township of 
Clinton N.J., 984 F.2d 1359, 1366 (3d Cir. 1993) ("On plaintiff's 
side of the balance, we must . . . consider the interests of the 
public in plaintiff's speech.").  Determining whether Green's 
appearance is protected activity under Pickering is an issue of 
law for the court to decide.  See Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 
1878, 1884 (1994). 
 1.  A Matter of Public Concern 
 Initially we must determine whether Green's appearance 
as a character witness is a matter of public concern.  See 
Swineford, l5 F.3d at l270-72.  We have held a public employee's 
appearance as a witness, even in the absence of actual testimony, 
is "speech" under Pickering.  Pro, 81 F.3d at 1291.  A public 
employee's speech involves a matter of public concern if it can 
"be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, 
social, or other concern to the community."  Connick v. Myers, 
461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983); see also Watters, 55 F.3d at 892; 
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Versarge, 984 F.2d at 1364.  This determination turns on the 
content, form and context of the public employee's speech.  See 
Watters, 55 F.3d at 892.4  The district court held Green's court 
appearance was a matter of public concern.  We agree. 
 In Pro v. Donatucci, we recognized that a public 
employee's court appearance in response to a subpoena is a matter 
of public concern.  81 F.3d at 1291.  The plaintiff in that case, 
Sisinia Pro, was subpoenaed by her employer's wife to appear as a 
witness at her employer's divorce proceedings.  Pro appeared at 
the hearing but was never called to testify.  She was fired 
shortly thereafter.  Pro brought suit against her employer under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming he fired her in retaliation for 
protected activity.  We found that Pro had a First Amendment 
right to appear in court despite the fact that the content of her 
speech was "purely private," because the form and context of her 
speech was of public concern, i.e. an appearance to deliver sworn 
testimony before an adjudicatory body.  In explaining our 
holding, we stated, "[T]he public employee's interest in 
                     
4.  In Holder v. City of Allentown, 987 F.2d 188 (3d Cir. 1993), 
we explained: 
 
The content of the speech may help to characterize it as relating 
to a matter of social or political concern of the 
community if, for example, the speaker seeks to `bring 
to light actual or potential wrongdoing or breach of 
public trust' on the part of government officials.  The 
form and context of the speech may help to characterize 
it as relating to a matter of social or political 
concern to the community if, for example, the forum 
where the speech activity takes place is not confined 
merely to the public office where the speaker is 
employed. 
 
Id. at 195 (citations omitted). 
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responding to a subpoena and the judicial interest in having 
state employees respond to subpoenas without fear of employer 
reprisal justify our ruling.  Moreover, . . . there is no 
`practical distinction between retaliation on the basis of a 
public employee's actual testimony and the retaliation that Pro 
alleges.'"  Id. (quoting Pro v. Donatucci, No. 94-CV-6001, 1995 
WL 552980, at *4 n.3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 18, 1995)).   
 We declined to rule in Pro whether a public employee's 
voluntary appearance in court, not under subpoena, would be a 
matter of public concern.  See id. at 1291 n.3.  That is one of 
the issues facing us here, and it merits some discussion.   
 Although in practical terms it may be inconsequential 
whether a witness has been subpoenaed (one can "volunteer" to 
receive a subpoena), there would appear to be a conceptual 
distinction that turns on a witness's will or desire to testify, 
especially in this context where the witness is a law enforcement 
officer.  It should matter, therefore, whether a police officer 
chooses to interject himself into a bail hearing, which is an 
adversary proceeding, as a character witness for a defendant.  On 
the other hand, there is a compelling reason to find Green's 
appearance to be a matter of public concern regardless of its 
voluntary nature.  That reason, of course, is the integrity of 
the truth seeking process. 
 For guidance we will turn, as we did in Pro, to a line 
of cases from the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit holding 
a public employee's truthful testimony, even if voluntary, is 
inherently a matter of public concern protected by the First 
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Amendment.  See id. at 1288 (citing Reeves v. Claiborne County 
Bd. of Educ., 828 F.2d 1096, 1100-01 (5th Cir. 1987); Johnston v. 
Harris County Flood Control Dist., 869 F.2d 1565, 1578 (5th Cir. 
1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1019 (1990)).  As the Fifth Circuit 
observed, "When an employee testifies before an official 
government adjudicatory or fact-finding body he speaks in a 
context that is inherently of public concern.  Our judicial 
system is designed to resolve disputes, to right wrongs.  We 
encourage uninhibited testimony, under penalty of perjury, in an 
attempt to arrive at the truth.  We would compromise the 
integrity of the judicial process if we tolerated state 
retaliation for testimony that is damaging to the state."  
Johnston, 869 F.2d at 1578 (quotations and citations omitted); 
see also Smith v. Hightower, 693 F.2d 359, 368 (5th Cir. 1982) 
("[T]he first amendment protects the right to testify truthfully 
at trial."). 
  Identical concerns are implicated by Green's voluntary 
appearance at Keller's bail hearing, where the court depends upon 
accurate testimony by those familiar with the defendant in order 
to determine whether the defendant is likely to flee or endanger 
the community.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (judicial officer must 
release defendant on bail unless such release "will not 
reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required or 
will endanger the safety of any other person or the community."). 
 The utility of uninhibited testimony and the integrity of the 
judicial process would be damaged if we were to permit unchecked 
retaliation for appearance and truthful testimony at such 
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proceedings.  Not only would "the first amendment right of the 
witness be infringed by this type of coercion, the judicial 
interest in attempting to resolve disputes by arriving at the 
truth would be in jeopardy.  Furthermore, a witness who succumbed 
to any real or imagined coercion could also be subject to a 
charge of perjury."  Reeves, 828 F.2d at 1100.   
 In Pro, we held the context of a courtroom appearance 
raises speech to a level of public concern, regardless of its 
content.  Pro, 81 F.3d at 1291; see also Johnston, 869 F.2d at 
1578 ("The goal of grand jury proceedings, of criminal trials, 
and of civil trials is to resolve a dispute by gathering the 
facts and arriving at the truth, a goal sufficiently important to 
render testimony given in these contexts speech `of public 
concern.'"); Reeves, 828 F.2d at 1100 (holding sworn subpoenaed 
testimony is matter of public concern, even though the content of 
the testimony "did not concern the type of political speech which 
lies at the core of first amendment freedoms"); Langley v. Adams 
County, Colo., 987 F.2d 1473, 1479 (10th Cir. 1993) ("The law is 
clearly established that the `First Amendment protects the right 
to testify truthfully at trial.'").  But see Wright v. Illinois 
Dep't of Children & Families Servs., 40 F.3d 1492, 1505 (7th Cir. 
1994) (declining to adopt Fifth Circuit analysis); Arvinger v. 
Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 862 F.2d 75, 79 (4th Cir. 
1988) (emphasizing the importance of content over context).  We 
can discern no reason why a voluntary appearance would eliminate 
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the public interest.  Therefore, we hold that Green's voluntary 
appearance as a character witness is a matter of public concern.5 
 2.  Balance of Interests 
 The question remains whether Green's free speech 
interest in testifying as a character witness is outweighed by 
any injury the speech could cause to the interests of the Housing 
Authority Police Department as employer.  See Waters, 114 S. Ct. 
at 1884; Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568; Swineford, l5 F.3d at l272. 
 If Green's court appearance could potentially disrupt the work 
of the Housing Authority Police Department, and this potential 
for injury outweighs the public's interest in Green's speech, 
then judgment for the defendants is proper.  See Waters, 114 S. 
Ct. at 1890 (weighing First Amendment "value" of speech against 
"the potential disruptiveness of the speech").  The district 
court granted the Housing Authority judgment as a matter of law, 
finding Green's appearance injured the DETF's interests in 
minimizing departmental disruption and maintaining an environment 
of trust and security. 
                     
5.  Judge Roth would note that had this Court not held in Pro v. 
Donatucci, 81 F.3d at 1288-91, that a public employee's potential 
sworn testimony before an adjudicatory body was a matter of 
public concern and protected by the First Amendment, she would 
dissent on the issue of whether the public employee's actions 
here were a matter of public concern.  She dissented in Pro on 
the basis that compliance with a subpoena is not speech.  She 
does not, however, believe that she can distinguish the present 
case from Pro on the sole basis that here the public employee had 
not been subpoenaed.  Were Pro not precedent, she would disagree 
with the panel that a non-subpoenaed appearance by a public 
employee, much less than a subpoenaed appearance, is a matter of 
public concern.  She would nevertheless concur in the ultimate 
conclusion that, due to their potential disruptive impact, the 
actions here were not protected speech. 
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 Normally, this balancing test would be an issue of fact 
and would remain in the hands of the fact finder.  But where the 
presence of factual disputes would normally preclude the court 
from ruling as a matter of law, Supreme Court precedent requires 
the trial court to do so.  "Although such particularized 
balancing is difficult, the courts must reach the most 
appropriate possible balance of the competing interests. . . . 
[Courts] are compelled to examine for [them]selves the statements 
in issue and the circumstances under which they [are] made to see 
whether or not they . . . are of a character which the principles 
of the First Amendment . . . protect."  Connick, 461 U.S. at 150 
& n.10 (quoting Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 335 (1946)). 
 In weighing the competing interests, we begin with the 
proposition that all court appearances are matters of public 
concern.  That is so because all court appearances implicate the 
public's interest in the integrity of the truth seeking process 
and the effective administration of justice.  But at the same 
time, it would appear that the strength of the public's interest 
can vary based on the nature of the court appearance.  See Pro, 
81 F.3d at 1291 n.4 ("We have not held that courtroom testimony 
should receive `absolute' First Amendment protection.") 
 It is of some moment, therefore, that Green appeared 
voluntarily, not in response to a subpoena.  As we have held, a 
voluntary court appearance is a matter of public concern.  We 
encourage voluntary testimony so that parties and courts have 
access to all available information and witnesses.  But the 
public interest favoring subpoenaed testimony is even stronger.  
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It implicates not only the integrity of the truth seeking process 
and the effective administration of justice, but also the 
public's interest in protecting court-ordered conduct.  See id. 
at 1290 ("A subpoenaed witness has no choice but to appear at a 
trial, unless he is willing to risk a finding of contempt.") 
(quoting Pro v. Donatucci, No. 94-CV-6001, 1995 WL 552980, at 
*13-14 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 18, 1995)).  As Green appeared 
voluntarily, it would seem that the public's interest in his 
court appearance is somewhat more limited than it would be if his 
appearance were subpoenaed. 
   Nor do we find it significant that Green appeared as a 
witness at a bail hearing as opposed to a trial.  Reputation 
testimony is probative in either.  In addition, while some 
commentators have implied that character testimony is less 
important than fact testimony,6 we believe no distinction should 
be made between character and fact testimony for Pickering 
purposes.  Both are essential to the truth seeking process.7 
                     
6.  See, e.g., McCormick on Evidence 549 (Edward W. Cleary ed.) 
(3d ed. 1984) ("[I]n many situations, the probative value [of 
character evidence] is slight and the potential for prejudice 
large."). 
7.  See, e.g., United States v. Logan, 717 F.2d 84, 87-93 (3d 
Cir. 1983) (discussing the importance of character testimony, and 
recommending a jury instruction that, "[w]here a defendant has 
offered evidence of good general reputation for truth and 
veracity, . . . the jury should consider such evidence along with 
all the other evidence in the case" and that "[e]vidence of a 
[criminal] defendant's reputation . . . may give rise to a 
reasonable doubt"); see also Committee on Model Crim. Jury 
Instructions Within the 8th Cir., Manual of Model Crim. Jury 
Instructions for the District Courts of the 8th Cir. 89 (1994) 
(some circuits now favor a jury instruction that character 
evidence should be considered together with all other evidence in 
a case; the "standing alone" charge is seen as an unwarranted 
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 In comparison, the interests of the Housing Authority 
Police Department as employer are very significant.  They include 
successfully fighting drugs and crime, protecting the safety of 
its officers and other members of the community, fostering trust 
and confidence among its officers and between its officers and 
other law enforcement drug units, and protecting the Housing 
Authority Police Department's reputation.  As defendants state in 
their brief on appeal, they were concerned "that the plaintiff's 
voluntary appearance, as a narcotics officer, at a bail hearing 
on behalf of a reputed organized crime associate would bring 
discredit upon the [Housing Authority Police Department], 
endanger the plaintiff and tarnish the image of the [Housing 
Authority Police Department] in the eyes of the residents of 
public housing the department serves . . . ."  (Appellee's Br. at 
5.)  These interests merit substantial protection, and any risk 
of departmental injury or disruption weighs heavily under the 
Pickering balancing test. 
 We agree with the district court that there was a risk 
of departmental injury based on the "potential disruptiveness of 
the speech."  Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1890.  First, an unnamed 
police officer telephoned Rosenstein to report Green's appearance 
at Keller's hearing.  Second, Green testified at trial he heard 
comments from co-workers and friends that "[g]uys wouldn't want 
to work with me because they were afraid that I knew people in 
the mob . . . ." (J.A. at 59.)  Finally, because of the nature of 
(..continued) 
invasion of the jury's special function in deciding what weight 
to give any particular item of evidence.). 
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DETF work, any perceived breach of trust and security could 
reasonably constitute a threat to the DETF, its officers and its 
relationships with other police drug units and the community it 
serves.  This risk of injury to the Housing Authority Police 
Department outweighs the public interest favoring Green's speech. 
 Judgment as a matter of law for defendants is proper under 
Pickering. 
 Green argues he should not be held responsible for 
creating the potential disruption because he followed 
departmental procedures and testified only after receiving 
express permission from his superiors.  But a public employee in 
a sensitive position like Green cannot turn a blind eye to the 
possible consequences of his voluntary testimony.  The 
responsibility must lie with Green to investigate the nature of 
the criminal charges, and to bear any risks associated with his 
voluntary court appearance.8 
 Green also claims that the Housing Authority Police 
Department's reasons for his transfer were pretextual, i.e. that 
the potential for departmental disruption was not the true cause 
for his transfer.  But the test in Waters is an objective one for 
"potential disruptiveness."  Waters, 114 S. Ct. at 1890; see also 
Watters, 55 F.3d at 896.  Therefore any pretext is irrelevant to 
our weighing analysis. 
                     
8.  Nor do we believe this case raises questions of equitable 
estoppel.  For example, if Green had been granted permission to 
testify after advising his supervisors that Keller was an 
organized crime associate, the Housing Authority Police 
Department might well be estopped from imposing sanctions. 
  
 
 17 
 The second step in the Pickering analysis, whether the 
protected activity was a substantial or motivating factor in the 
transfer decision, would be a factual issue for the jury.  But 
under Pickering we do not reach this step.  Nor do we reach the 
third step in the analysis, whether defendants would have 
transferred Green even in the absence of his speech.  Therefore 
we will affirm the district court.   
 3.  Conclusion 
 Implicit in Green's claims is the notion his transfer 
was unfair under the circumstances.  Green voluntarily chose to 
testify as a character witness for the son of a friend.  He 
followed the applicable rules and received permission to testify, 
although neither the Housing Authority Police Department nor he 
knew of the organized crime association.  He appeared at the bail 
hearing, but when he realized the nature of the charges facing 
Keller and his association with organized crime, he left the 
hearing without testifying.  His superiors testified they do not 
believe he has any association with organized crime and, in fact, 
if they had, Green would have been fired. 
 Nonetheless, the Housing Authority Police Department 
contends Green's actions were potentially disruptive to the 
proper functioning of the department.  Whether there is potential 
disruption is an issue of law for the court.  We have found there 
was a likelihood of disruption and that it outweighs the 
interests favoring the protected activity.   
 Had Green been fired instead of reassigned, the penalty 
would have appeared especially severe in view of his supervisors' 
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belief that he had no association with organized crime.  It may 
be argued, therefore, that the degree of harm should be factored 
into the test.  But if the proper standard is the potential for 
disruption, it is difficult to see how the extent of harm can be 
taken into account. 
 Of course, different facts can change the calculus.  In 
weighing the protected interest against the likelihood of 
disruption, it is especially significant that a law enforcement 
officer whose primary duty is to fight drugs testified as a 
character witness for a defendant who was part of an organization 
well known for its involvement in the drug trade.  The 
correlation could not be more direct nor more damaging to the 
Housing Authority Police Department's role.  A more oblique 
correspondence might well bring a different result under the 
weighing process. 
 B.  Section 1985(2) 
 Green also brought a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2), 
alleging defendants illegally conspired to transfer him in 
retaliation for his appearance as a character witness in federal 
court.  But, as we have held, defendants' transfer of Green was 
not unlawful.  For the reasons we have stated and for those given 
by the district court, we hold the dismissal of Green's § 1985(2) 
claim was proper. 
 C.  State Constitution 
 Green also sued defendants under the Pennsylvania 
Constitution for deprivation of reputation without due process.  
The district court rejected Green's deprivation of reputation 
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claim as a matter of law because Green could not establish a 
causal connection between his reputation injury and the 
defendants' conduct.  We agree this claim was properly dismissed. 
 III.  Conclusion 
 For these reasons we will affirm the judgment of the 
district court.9 
                     
9.  In light of our decision to uphold the district court's 
dismissal of Green's claims, there is no need to discuss the 
other issues on appeal:  whether the trial court erred in 
excluding certain evidence of harm to plaintiff's reputation and 
in ruling that punitive damages could not be awarded.   
